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COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION 
AND THE LAW OF THE CHARTER 
William O. Miller 
I-INTRODUCTION 
The subjects of "intervention" and 
its corollary of "nonintervention" are, 
without doubt, two of the most contro-
ven~ial in the literature of international 
law.1 I t is even difficult to find any 
substantial aweement among interna-
tional law publicists as to the meaning 
of the terms. The definition of "inter-
vention" which seems to command the 
most agreement, however, has been 
phrased as follows: " ... any act of 
interference by one state in the affairs 
of another; but in a more special sense it 
means dictatorial interference in the 
domestic or foreign affairs of another 
state which impairs that state's indepen-
dence.,,2 The doctrine of "noninterven-
tion," being inextricably intertwined 
with what at hest JJlW~t he de~crill('d as 
Ihr mnbil!lIollS conl'l'pl of "intrr\"l'n-
tion:' nl'\'I'rtlll'h,ss has Il('l'n ;II'I'I'ptl'II 
allllo:::t univer:::ally as a proper guideline 
for thc conduct of statrs. It found its 
most inclusive definition and its most 
comprehensive endorsement in General 
Assembly Resolution Number 2131 
(XX), as follows: 
No State has the right to inter-
vrnc, dircctly or indircetly, for 
anv reason whatever, in the in-
te;nal or external affairs of any 
other State. Consequently, armed 
intervention and all othcr (orms 
of interference or attempted 
threats against the personality of 
the State or against its political, 
economic and cultural elements 
are condemned.3 
It is the purpose of the discussion 
which follows to develop the proposi-
tion that these broad pronouncements, 
whil!' appearing to proscribe the "dirta:. 
lorial inll'rfefl'ncI' in 1111' IIffllirs of n 
slall,," 110 not tlo so at 1111. hilI rallll'r 
serve only to transfer competence to 
exerdse this "dictatorial interference" 
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from individual slales to eollcdivities of 
slales acting rithcr throul!h or under Ihe 
au spiers of the United Nations. This 
proposition has as it!l hasie conceptioll 
that intervcntion, as defined above and 
subject to the concepts of nccessity and 
proportionality, has always b('l'n rc'eo~­
nized as a lawful exercise of the in-
disputable international right of sanc-
tion, usable to enforce an international 
legal right, and that intervention, as a 
sanction, has neither been restricted nor 
proscrihed; that only the competence to 
apply it has changed. It wiII he further 
demonstratrd that this very process of 
multilateralizinl! the right of sanction 
has resulted in thc development and u,.e 
by thc Great Power,. of regional collec-
tivities through which they seek to 
exrrcise the right of sanction for politi-
cal rather than legal purposes. 
In developing this thesis, the concept 
of intervention as a "dictatorial inter-
ference in the affairs of a state" will be 
accepted, specifically, however, with the 
limitation that intervention is taken 
only for the purpose of compelling a 
state to satisfy its international obliga-
tions.4 Thus, intervention wiII he dis-
cussed as the process through which the 
international community seeks to prc-
vent an international drlict from dcvel-
oping into an international dispute or 
through which it othrrwi,.e sl'l'ks to 
redress an international wrong. Divorced 
from this discussion wiII be those acts of 
interfercnee by a state in the affairs of 
anothcr statc which do not have cither 
an actual or a claimed antccedent inter-
national delict. Such acts have uni-
versally been considered as unlawful and 
prohibited by customary international 
lawS unlcss they were based on an 




A IIISTOIUCAL SKETCH 
Tlwrt, i:..: l"'rtainly no douht"" thai thl' 
traditional international law failed to 
provide any workahle system through 
which a !llatl~, ulili~in~ ('I'nlrali~I'd pro-
('('dures, could SI'(,k l'('dn'ss for n wrong 
done to it hy another state. This wa!l :1 
horizontal system in which all sUUjcctf; 
wrre thcorrtically rqual and in which 
Ilwre w('r(' no ('slahli!llw(1 pro('rdllrt's 10 
s('ek redress through community sanc-
tions. The only genuine restrictions on 
thc acts of a state dependcd on con-
siderations of reciprocity! or on the 
power relationships between an of-
fending and an offended state. Because 
of the primitive nature of this system 
and because there was a necessity to 
provide some procedure beyond that of 
inefft'ctivr reciprocal and s('lf-imposrd 
restraints for thc enforcement of intcr-
national obligations, thcre developed 
the practice of self-help. i\luch like thc 
situation which exists in any primitive 
society, it was necessary for each indi-
vidual-i.e., each state-to rcly on its 
OWI1 ability, its own strength, to f;crk 
redress for wrongs done to it. Self-help 
has thus " ... been universally recog-
nized as a means of enforcement ... [of 
international law, i.e.,] ... as a sanc-
tion.,,2 There were basically two typcs 
of forcible self-help available. The first 
was war and the second was the doc-
trine of reprisals. 3 I nlrrvcntion, as de-
filll'd abovc. arose as a form of n'prh;aI. 
it wa:; nothing more nor Irss than a 
manifestation of "the dependence of 
law in a primitive communi!l upon 
various tcehniques of self-help.' Forer-
ful interventions in the form of reprisal~ 
therefore were recognized as lawful, 
circumscribed only by the requirements 
of l1t>cessity and proportionality. The 
legitimacy of this type of forcible self-
help was made clear in Hague Conven-
tion Number II of 1907 when, for the 
first time, it was agreed " ... not to have 
rccourse to force for the recovery of 
('onlra('1 <It'hls dIll' from onr Sial<' 10 
IiiI' nalional:; of anolill'r. hili in Ihal 
I'a:;,' 1I1011l'."S TIIII:;, it 1111:; hl'l'n :;ni,1 
Ihal, " ... with only o Ill' :;lI1all (':IVl'at, 
the ~reat powers immediately before 
World War I reaffirmed thr right of 
forl'ihle self-help. -,6 
The Covenant of the I,eague of 
Nations was the first break in this 
traditional philosophy. The adherents to 
the covenant agreed to "respect the 
territorial intrgrity and existin~ political 
independence" of other members7 and 
to submit to arhitration or to inquiry by 
the Council of the League of Nations 
those disputes of an international nature 
which could not he settled by diplo-
macy.s Following shortly on the heels 
of the covenant came the Pact of Paris, 
or the Kellogg-Brillnd Pael, in which the 
parties agrerd that "selliement or solu-
tion of all disputes or confli('ts of 
whatever nature or of whatever origin 
they may be, which may arise among 
them shall never be sought except by 
pacific means."9 At about this same 
time the Latin Ameriean Rrpublies 
brgan to vorcc, in concl'rt, strl'IlUOUS 
opposition to the intervention policy 
which the United States had followed 
extensively in the Western Hemisphere 
since the mid-WOO's. Tn Rio de Janeiro 
in J 927 the Inter-A merican Commis~ion 
of Jurists recommended to the forth-
coming Conference of Havana that it 
consider adopting the principii' that 
"No nation has a right to inli'rft'rt' in 
the intrrnal or forl'ign affairs of 1111 
Americlln Hepuhlir against the will of 
that Hrpuhlic.,,1 0 While U.S. objeetions 
prevented adoption of this principle in 
J 9211,11 it wm~ arlopted in 1 <):3:3 with 
U.S. reservations I 2 and finally in 
Ruenos Aires in JCJ:3() without {I.S. 
reservations. In article I of the Addi-
tional Protocol Relative to Non-Tnter-
vention,I3 adopted by the American 
states at Buenos Aires, the parties de-
clared as "inadmissible the intervention 
of anyone of them, directly or in-
directly, and for whatever reason, in the 
intl'rnal or I'xlt'rlHlI affairs of any olht'r 
of the Part iI'S. " This principle WllS rc-
peatl'rl and hroadt'l1I'll in till' I )('("Iara-
tion of Principles of Inter-Anwrican 
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Solillarity and Cooperation in this 
lan~uage: 
(a) Intervention by one State 
in the internal or external affairs 
of another State is condemned; 
(b) Forcible collection of 
pecuniary debts is illegal; and 
(e) Any difference or dispute 
between the American nations, 
whatever its nature or origin, shall 
be settled by the methods of 
conciliation, or full arbitration, or 
through the o~eration of inter-
national justice. 4 
By the time of the Mexico City 
Conference of 1945, this principle had 
become ingrained in inter-American law, 
and the Act of Chapultepec simply 
reiterated its "condemnation of inter-
vention in the internal or external af-
fairs of another.,,1 5 Thus, when the 
members of the United Nations met in 
San Francisco in' 1945 to draft the 
Charter of the United Nations, the 
unilateral resort to force, even as a 
means of s(,lf-help. had received substan-
tial in ternational ronilemnlltion. 
TIll' rl'sults of the San (i'raneisco 
Confert'nct! relleet tIlt' same revulsion to 
tilt! unibteral USI~ of force as had lhl' 
various treaties referred to ahove. Ex-
pressing a determination to "save suc-
ceeding gencrations from the scourge of 
war, which twice in our lifetime has 
hrought untold sorrow to mankind, ,,16 
and a determination to "ensure ... that 
armed force shall not be used, save in 
the common interest,,,1 7 the writers of 
the charter stated that it was part of 
their purpose: 
To maintain international peaee 
and ~I'curily, and 10 thnt end: to 
lakl' dfective ('ollective IllC1H,urcS 
for the prtwI'nlion lind rt!l11ovnl of 
threats to the peace ... and to 
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bring about by peaceful means, 
and in conformity with the prin-
ciples of justice and international 
law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situa-
tions which might lead to a breach 
of the peace.1 8 
In support of this and other stated 
purposes, the members of the United 
Nations pledged themselves to "settle 
their international disputes by peaceful 
means in such a manner that interna-
tional peace" and security, and justice, 
d d ,,1 9 d "f' are not en angere, an to re ram 
in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against tl~e terri-
torial integrity or political independence 
of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations. ,,20 
The significant point here is that 
while the charter in article 2 (4) con-
tains a general prohibition of the uni-
lateral use of force in international 
relations, it promises an "effective col-
lective" substitute. Thus, in those situa-
tions where an international dispute 
cannot be settled by peaceful means 
between the parties, the charter 
promises the collective efforts of the 
organized intcrnational community to 
take such measures as are necessary to 
prevent or remove any thrcat to the 
peace which mayor does result. The 
charter would therefore no longer per-
mit a state to take the law in its own 
hands and to seek redress by force. 
Given the law of the charter, the primi-
tive international law of the jungle 
would be replaced by a civilized deter-
mination of right and wrong, of delict 
and redress, and of rights and responsi-
bilities. Whether or not the charter has 
constructed collective machinery ade-
quate to this purpose, however, is quite 
another question and, it would Sl'em, a 
most rrucial one. For if the promised 
suhstitute for unilatc'ral action is not 
forthcoming, states could hardly be 
expected to refrain from developing 
other procedures and perhaps from even 
falling back to thrir prior practicc of 
unilatl'ral forcihle scM-help. "Clt·arly, a 
law which pro hi hits resort to force," or 
stated otherwise, which prohibits the 
resort to unilateral self-help, "without 
providing a legitimate claimant with 
adequate means of obtaining redress, 
contains the seeds of trouble. ,,21 It has 
even been argued that "( I] f the collec-
tive organization, through a fault in its 
organizing instrument, leaves a gap 
where the use of force is necessary but 
the coIleetive organization is impotent 
to act, then the legal right to use force 
must, in such instance, revert "back to 
the members.,,2 2 I t is abundantly clear 
from current international practice that 
this process has long since begun. States 
have sought, and are seeking, substitutes 
for the promised universal actions which 
seldom materialize. The impotence of 
the international community as a whole 
has led to the development of smaIler 
coIlectivities which, while demon-
strating a capacity to act, have at the 
same time shown that the compatibility 
of their actions with the more compre-
hensive provisions of the charter is 
sometimes open to serious question. 
III-CHARTER REGULATION OF 
THE USE OF FORCE 
General Provisions. As noted ahove, 
artiele 2 (tl.) of the charter contains u 
gl'Il!'raI prohihition of the tltrl~at or II:-;C~ 
of force "against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any 
state .... " Only two exceptions to this 
general prohibition are provided: (1) 
Preventive or enforcement actions tuken 
by or under the auspices of the United 
Nations, provided for in article 42 of 
the charter; and (2) individual or eollec: 
tive self-defense, provided for in urticle 
51. All othl'r rrsorts to the usC' of force 
in inLrrnational n·lations "fall into the 
category of international cll'lid:-;" and 
are themselves violations of interna-
tional law. 1 This reflects the charter's 
purpose to "('liminat/' the thrl'at or ure 
of force wlll,ther it be lawful or unlaw-
ful under gt'neral international law" 
except in legitimate self-defense or as a 
part of the collective sanctioning 
process? There should be little doubt, 
therefore, that unilateral, forcible self-
help as an aceeptablt' sanction in inter-
national law has been prohibited.3 
There are, then, only two permissihle 
usl's of armed force under the charter. 
The first of these-the collective pro-
cesses by or under the auspices of the 
United Nations-are provided essentially 
through powers granted to the Security 
Council in chapter VII of the charter. 
Article 39 invests the Security Council 
with the authority and responsibility to 
"determine thl' existence of any threat 
to the peace, breach of thl' peace, or act 
of aggression and ... l to] ..• make 
recommendations, or ..• [to] ... de-
cide what measures shall be taken to 
maintain or restore international peace 
and security." Article 42 provides for 
the use of armed force to accomplish 
this purpose if the peaceful, nonforceful 
measures of article 41 are considered 
inadequate; and article 48 provides that 
such action is to bl' carried out, suhject 
to the determination of the Security 
Council, hy "l\lembcrs of the United 
Nations directly and through their 
actions in the appropriate international 
agencies of which they are members." 
Article :10 makes it clear that this 
"preventive or enforcement action" is 
to be taken against statc.~. While this 
may seem an unnecessary observation, it 
is nevertheless a crucial one. By en-
dorsing these principles, states are seen 
to have relinquished a portion of their 
sovereignty and to have consented, in a 
proper case, to subject themselves to 
forcible but lawful pressures from with-
out. This is but a nl'ct's:::ary corollary to 
Professor J es:::up 's ar{!:umt'nt4 that tilt' 
prohihition of til<' use of forcl' in artiel(, 
2(.~) is a limitation on the traditional 
concept of sovereignty which permitted 
a state to re:::ort to force to redress a 
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wrong donc to it. I f this asped of 
sov('n~ignty is now limited hy int('rna-
tional law to an oJfrlldl!d stllte, it would 
necessarily follow, if any sort of effec-
tive system is to be maintained, that any 
previous right of an offending state to 
be immune from the application of 
force must likewise be Iimited.s The 
importance of these limitations lies in 
the fact that they effect a significant 
modification of the nonintervention 
principle as previously expressed. Inter-
vention is now specifically legitimatized 
when taken by or under the auspices of 
the international community as a whole. 
Intervention, then, at least in the terms 
in which it was defined above, is specifi-
cally sanctioned by the charter. 
It must be said, tht'refore, that the 
charter seeks to make significant inroads 
on the traditional concept of sover-
eignty as an "absolute, uncontrolled 
state wiII, ultimately free to resort to 
the final arbitrament of war, ,,6 and as a 
tradition under which states "do not 
readily yield to concepts of interna-
tional supervision.,,7 The charter seeks 
to remove the "quicksand on which the 
foundations of traditional law are 
huilt"S and to suhstitute in its stead the 
firmer base of collective supervision and 
collective action. 
Provisions Relating to Regional Or-
ganizations. As was noted above, chap-
ter VII of the charter assigns to the 
Security Council the primary responsi-
bility for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security and the pri-
mary authority to take such action and 
to provide such sanctions as may be 
necessary to that end. 
An important part of the machinery 
through which these actions may be 
accomplished are the regional arrange-
ments recognized in chapter VIII. The 
part that such organizations could and 
should play in the collN'tive strUt'tum 
was debated at length both at Dumbar-
ton Oaks and at the San Francisco 
Conference.9 The result was twofold-
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the recognition in article 5 J of the right 
of collective self-defense and the inclu-
sion of articles 52, 5il, and 54 to 
provide a legal framework for recon-
ciling the actions of regional organiza-
tions with those of the United Nations. 
These laLLer provisions have been 
criticized as a compromise of the con-
cept of universalism and as resulting in 
an ambiguous legal rationale concerning 
the relative jurisdictional competences 
of the United Nations on the one hand 
and a regional organization on the other 
and concerning just what measures or 
actions are within the authority of a 
regional grouping. 1 0 
It is true that the recognition of the 
"inherent right of individual or collec-
tive self-defense" in article 51 did repre-
sent a concession to those states-par-
ticularly the Latin American States-
which desired' to see a measure of 
regional autonomy in their respective 
groupings. This was considered neces-
sary, particularly insofar as self-defen-
sive actions were concerned, in order to 
prevent a possible Great Power veto in 
the Security Council from precluding 
essential, defensive actions. 1 1 Article 
51, then, was specifically in tended to 
permit a regional grouping or an indi-
vidual state to take necessary mem:ures 
in self-defense and to continue such 
actions until "the Security Council has 
taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security.,,12 
The ambiguity arises when this right 
of a regional organization to use force in 
self-defense is compared with the char-
ter provisions relating to disputes which 
it may attempt to settle and "measures" 
or "actions" which it may take. Article 
52, while recognizing the primary re-
sponsibility of the Security Council,1 3 
charges members of the United Nations 
who arc also members of a regional 
organization with making "I'very t'ffort 
to achievr raeifie st'lllt'nH'nt of I(wal 
dispult's I hrough sUl"h n'p:iollal ap'n-
I'il's ... lwfort' n'[t'rrillp: tlwlIl 10 t\tl' 
~ecurity Coundl." And artirle 53 
aulhorizes tlU! S('l"Urity Coundl to uti-
lizr such arnmgl'ments for "ellfort't'-
ment actions uIHh'r its authority." With 
one exception not here pertinent,14 
however, prohibition is made of any 
enforcement action "without tlw autho-
rization of the Security Council." 
These provisions have given rise to 
repeated controversy between those 
states seeking a measure of regional 
competency in settling regional disputes 
and those seeking to maintain the pri-
macy of the central organization. The 
controversy has been . twofold and may 
be expressed as follows: (1) Is there a 
jurisdictional conflict between the Se-
curity Council and a given r<'gional 
organization; and (2) What actions, if 
any, may a regional organization take 
without prior Security Council authori-
zation? 
The jurisdictional problem. This 
portion of the controversy concerns 
itself with which body, the Security 
Council or a regional organization, has 
the competence to deal with a particular 
dispute. Does either body possess an 
exclusive right to hear and determine 
the dispute? Or, is there a shared com-
petence; and, if so, does either body 
have a primary right to proeeed?I 5 
Tht, language of tht! c1l:lrlt'r would 
appear to resolve c1t~arly thit; i:lHIIC in 
favor of a shared competence hut with a 
recognized primacy in the Security 
Council. Article 52(2) does counsel 
members of regional organizations to 
make every effort to settle their dis-
putes within that regional framework 
"before referring them to the Security 
Council." Article 52(4), however, makes 
it clear that this "in no way impairs" 
the right of the Security Council to act 
in the case or the right of any member 
to request Security Council action. 
The Gualt'mala Casr. This isslII' 
was first <h'hatt'" bt'[om IIH' SI'I'uril\" 
COllncil in .I une JI)5.~, when G ualt·mala 
requested that the Security Council 
convene to consider its allegations of 
aggression against Nicaragua and Hon-
duras, so that it could take the neces-
sary measures "to prevent the disrup-
tion of peace and international security 
in this part of Central America. ,,16 The 
Governments of both Nicaragua and 
Honduras expressed surprise that this 
matter should have heen brought before 
the Security Council when there were 
available the processes of the Organiza-
tion of American States which, they 
said, were established to hear inter-
American differences.17 Brazil sub-
mitted a draft resolution by which the 
Security Council would have referred 
the matter to the OAS for its urgent 
consideration. The debates which fol-
lowed saw a wide divergence of opinion 
as to the course which the Security 
Council was obliged to follow. The most 
restrictive view was presented by the 
delegate from Colombia, as follows: 
I should like to make it quite clear 
that the provisions of Article 52, 
paragraph 2, of the United Na-
tions Charter impose on all Mem-
bers the duty to apply first to the 
regional organization, which is of 
necessity the court of first appeal. 
This is not a right which can be 
renounced because the States 
which signed the Charter under-
took this obligation.111 
On the other hand, the representative of 
the Soviet Union argued that it was "the 
Council's duty to take responsibility 
and to take urgent steps to end the 
aggression,,,19 and he announced that 
he would exercise the Soviet Union's 
right of veto on any resolution which 
referred the matter to the OAS for 
action. 
rVlost of the remaining members of 
thr S('curity Council clearly favored 
rl'frrencl' of IIII' malll'r to Ihr OAS, 
altholl~h it is obvious Ihat this was nol 
considered as rrlinquishing Security 
Council jurisdiclion in the mattrr. Thl' 
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resolutio!J.. which was finally put to a 
vote called for immediate termination 
of acts likely to cause further bloodshed 
and would have referred the complaint 
to the OAS for eonsideration. True to 
his threat, however, th(~ repres,mtative 
of the Soviet Union cast a negative vote 
and prevented the resolution from 
carrying. A substitute resolution was 
quickly passed. I t read as follows: 
The Security Council. 
Having considered on an urgent 
basis the communication of the 
Government of Guatemala to the 
President of the Security Council, 
Calls for the immediate termina-
tion of any action likely to cause 
further bloodshed and requests all 
Members of the United Nations to 
abstain, in the spirit of the Char-
ter, from rendering any assistance 
to any such action.2o 
The matter was again raised on 25 
June 1954 at the 676th meeting of the 
Security Council, when a debate took 
place concerning whcther or not the 
Council should again place the Guate-
malan complaint on its agenda. These 
dehates saw the representative of Brazil, 
OlH:e lI~ain, contmllling Ihal Ilw ()AS 
WllS the proper organization to senle 
this dispute. Since thc Inter-American 
Peace Committee was already acting in 
the matter, he was able to cite its 
activities in support of his arguments.21 
Colombia, citing pertinent provisions of 
the OAS Charter,2 2 reiterated its argu-
ment that the regional machinery of the 
OAS must be utilized before Security 
Council competence is invoked, since to 
do otherwise, he said, would "imply a 
disauthorization of the American 
a~l'nry" to which Colombia could not-
23 '1'1 S . lJ' I n:"'TI'('. I(! • ov\('1 ilion wm~ III 1111111111 
ill ils insistl'lIcn that the maUer must h(' 
placl~d on the agrnda of the Security 
Council. I t poinLt~d out Ihat the 
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Security Council had already acted in 
the case by its resolution adopted in the 
675th meeting, and argued that now it 
was time that the Security Council 
"adopted measures to ensure the fulfill-
ment of" its decision.24 Ambassador 
Lodge of the United States asserted that 
the Security Council was faced for the 
first time with the problem of trans-
lating into reality the charter formula 
providing for a balance between the 
principle of "universality, the effect of 
which was qualified by the veto power, 
and regional arrangements. "25 The sub-
stance of his arguments was as follows: 
The United States does not deny 
the propriety of this danger to the 
peace in Guatrmala heing brought 
to the attention of the Security 
Council in accordance with Ar-
ticle 35 of the Charter. That has 
been done .... The United States 
is, however, both legally and as a 
matter of honour, bound by its 
undertakings contained in Article 
52, paragraph 2 of the Charter of 
the United Nations and in Article 
20 of the Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States, to 
oppose consideration by the Se-
curity Council of this Guatemalan 
dispute until the matter has first 
been dealt with by the Organiza-
tion of American States which 
through its regularly constituted 
agencies, is dealing actively with 
the problem now .... Weare ~on- , 
vinced that failure of the Security 
Council to observe the restraints 
which were spelled out in the 
Charter will be a grave hlow to 
the entire system of international 
peace and security which the 
United Nations was designed to 
achieve.26 
The vote of the Security Council not 
to place the Gmltemalan complaint in 
its agenda27 has heen interpreted as a 
victory for the United States. sinre it 
was thus enabled 10 handle the matter 
in the councils of tit(' (lAS witcrc\ it was 
the dominant power unrestricted by the 
Soviet veto.28 While there may be some 
considerable justification for this argu-
ment, it still remains a basic fact, 
notwithstanding the positions advanced 
during the debates, that the failure of 
the Security Council to take direct 
action in the case cannot be properly 
construed as a determination that its 
competence docs not exist at least 
concurrently with that of a regional 
organization. To the contrary, the 
Security Council did act in the case by 
passing the resolution at its 675th meet-
ing. The refusal to take further action 
only reflected a preference for settle-
ment of this particular dispute at the 
regional level, where it appeared that 
the regional agency was capable of 
taking the necessary action. 
The handling of this dispute gives rise 
to certain initial observations con-
cerning the relative competences of the 
Security Council and a regional arrange-
ment. These are: 
The provIsIOns of article 
52(4) to the effect that the competence 
of a regional organization to make every 
effort to settle local disputes within the 
machinery of their regional grouping "in 
no way impairs the Iluthority of II II! 
Security Council" to be seized of the 
same matter remain valid; 
Regional organizations will 
be permitted to act in accordance with 
the authority granted to them where 
they demonstrate a practical ability to 
take effective action; and that therefore, 
It must be said that when 
first faced with the jurisdictional issue, 
the Security Council acted so as to 
endorse the principle that both they and 
a regional organization share compe-
t('nce-or possess concurrent jurisdic-
tion-and that the primary opportunity 
to act would probably be accorded the 
rt'gional grouping in tho~c l'a~('s when' it 
demonstrated an ability to act effec-
tively. 
The Cuban Case. This entire 
controversy was again raised before the 
Security Council in July 1960, when the 
Government of Cuha requested urgent 
consideration of "the grave situation 
which now exists ..• as a consequence 
of repeated threats, harassments, in-
trigues, reprisals and aggressive acts to 
which .•. L Cuba] .•• has been sub-
jected" by the United States.29 The 
Cuban representative began his presenta-
tion to the Council with this statement: 
The right of any State which is a 
Member of the United Nations to 
have recourse to the Security 
Council cannot be questioned. 
The regional agencies do not take 
precedence over the obligations of 
the Charter .... I t is obvious that 
regional arrangements made under 
the terms of Article 52 of the 
Charter entail rights which are of 
an optional rather than an exclu-
sive character, and that Member 
States may exercise whichever of 
those rights they choose.3o 
The representative of the United States 
replied that this matter was currently 
under consideration by the Council of 
the Organization of American States 
and that the "Security Council should 
take no action ... L until] ... discus-
sions have taken place •.. " in that 
Organization.31 He disclaimed any insis-
tl'nce, however, that this reflected in 
any way on the competence of the 
Security Council to hear the Cuban 
complaint. He stated: 
Let me say that it is not a 
question of which is greater or 
which is less-thl' Organization of 
An1l'rican Statrs or the lInitC'd 
Nation~. Tht' point i~ that it 
makl'S sl'n!'c·· and thl' Charter ~o 
indicatrs-to I!o to thl' rrl!ional 
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organization first and to the 
United Nations as a place of last 
resort. There is no question, of 
course, of replacing the United 
Nations.32 
This same rationale clearly motivated 
Argentina and Ecuador to submit a 
draft resolution,33 later adopted, under 
which the Security Couneil took note of 
the situation existing between Cuba and 
the United States and adjourned its 
consideration of the matter pending an 
invitation to the OAS to assist in re-
solving the dispute and to report its 
activities. The positions of the various 
members of the Security Council on this 
draft resolution reflected a three-way 
split in opinions on the jurisdictional 
issue. One extreme was represented br 
the United Kingdom34 and France3 
who contended that Cuba had a legal 
obligation under the charter and under 
the Charter of the Organization of 
American States to seek resolution of 
the matter in the regional agency prior 
to requesting action by the Security 
Council. On the other extreme were the 
Soviet Union and Poland who argued 
that the Security Council had primary 
jurisdiction in the matter and that it 
would be illegal to refer the matter to 
the OAS.36 The great majority of the 
vi(!ws expressed, however, were ill ac-
cord with those of the sponsors of the 
rcsolution-·that the resolution found "a 
formula, which while taking account of 
the fact that proceedings are under way 
in a regional agency, does not bar the 
parties concerned from access to the 
United Nations •..• "37 The language of 
the operative portions of the resolution 
compel this understanding of the Se-
curity Council's action, and it clearly 
supports the initial observations drawn 
above from the Guatemalan case. The 
Security Council, in handling the Cuban 
t~OJnplaint, was Ill;scrting its ultimate 
t'omllt'tt'l1l'e but WIIS dcfcrrinl-t to the 
pradical and, it was hoped, effective 
machinery of the rl'gionul gronping. 
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In late October 1960, Cuba renewed 
its complaint, this time in the Gcneral 
Asscmbly.38 In spite of the fact that by 
January 1961 Cuba was contending that 
its invasion was imminent, the General 
Assembly had taken no action on the 
case. Cuba, thus, on 4 January 1961, 
moved again to seek Security Council 
consideration of the matter.39 Al-
though the Cuban complaints were 
debated at length,40 the Security Coun-
cil did not take any official action on 
them. Thus, despite the fact that by late 
April 1961 the abortive Bay of Pigs 
invasion had actually occurred, the 
Cuban complaints stilI were left to the 
Organization of American States. This 
was recognized in a resolution later 
adopted by the General Assembly's 
First Committee on 21" April 1961.'u 
Although the Plenary Session of the 
General Assembly, in later acting on this 
First Committee Resolution, refused by 
a substantial majority to specifically 
refer to the OAS, this may not be said 
to diminish the significance of the prior 
actions of the Security Council in re-
ferring the matter to that organization. 
Conclusion. No case, subse-
quent to the two above discussed, has 
arisen in which the jurisdiction relation-
ships of the Security Council versus a 
re{!:ional organization have hecome a 
significant issue.' Although there were 
undertones of this controversy in the 
1963 dispute between the DOglinican 
Republic and Haiti and in the 1964 
complaint by Panama against the United 
States, both controversies found the 
parties mutually williI1: to utilize the 
procedures of the OAS. 2 
Notwithstanding the contrary con-
tentions made by some during the 
above-noted debates, it is concluded 
that the actions of the Security Council 
do not substantiate the argument thai a 
{!:Imuilll' iSS1U! concerning the rt'spedivt' 
jurisdidiolls of tIll' SI'('urity Counl'i1 and 
a rt'gional organizlItion w,{s ever joined. 
While some states did lIrgue to tlwt 
effect, the great majority of states 
clearly conccded concurrent jurisdiction 
in both bodies, but wiLh primary ril{ht 
to proceed in the Security Council. The 
issue was a political and a practical 
one-essentially, should the Security 
Council give practical substance, in a 
proper case, to the charter provisions 
relating to its use of regional organiza-
tions for the settlement of disputes 
which were of purely regional charac-
ter? This question was answered with a 
simple "yes." The answer did not mean, 
nor was it ever intended to mean, that a 
party to a dispute could be foreclosed 
from seeking Security Council assistance 
without first exhausting its remedies in 
the subordinate organization. Notwith-
standing this conclusion, however, it 
must be conceded that the great ma-
jority of members of the Security Coun-
cil did, in fact, make considerable con-
cessions to the proposition that a 
regional organization is a better forum 
for settling disputes than is the Security 
Council. The search for alternate means 
of settlement-i.e., means other than the 
veto-afflicted Security Council-was 
thus well on its way. 
The "enforcement action" issue. 
The second major controversy between 
the "regionalists" and the "univer-
salists" is concerned with the natum of 
the action which can be taken by a 
regional organization with respect to a 
dispute of which it is properly seized. 
This arises from the interaction of the 
provisions of article 52(2) and article 
53( I). The first of these charges the 
regional organization with making 
"every effort to achieve pacific settle-
ment of local disputes," while the latter 
specifically admonishes that" •.. no en-
forcement action may be taken under 
regional arrangements ... without the 
Lmlhorization of the St'curity C.olllwil." 
The I}ut'stion tlllls arist's m: 10 what 
an' tllest' "t'n foret'mcnt Ilt'lions" whidl 
are prohibited to a rt'gional organization 
without prior Security Council 
approval, lind whllt other lIctions lire Il'ft 
to its initilll competence? 
Neither reference to lhe records of 
the San Francisco Conference nor to 
other hackground papers to the char-
ter43 provide any real assistance in 
discovering the meaning of the term 
"enforcement action." Reference to the 
charter itself also fails to provide any 
direct assistance. The term appears only 
four times in the charter-alone in arti-
cle 45, twice, and in the phrase "preven-
tive and enforcement action" in article 
5. The term "enforcement measures," 
however, appears twice in the charter-
alone in article 2(7), and in the phrase 
"preventive and enforcement measures" 
in article 50. 
No key is readily lIppart'nt to the 
rt'asons he hind this different phrasing. 
There is no specific indication in either 
the charter H:seIT or in the background 
debates as to why the drafters used 
"enforcement action" in one article 
alone, in conjunction with "preventive 
action" in another, and why two other 
articlt's speak in tl'rms of prt'ventive or 
enforcement measures. One would Ct'r-
tainly assume, however, thllt if the 
drllfLers of the c1111rter meant tllll SlIlIIe 
thin~ in elleh of till'st' lIrtidt's thllt tllt'y 
would havt' lIst'd tllll sanlt' It'rlllinolo~y. 
It wClllld S('('III "I"lIr, th,'r"for(', thllt tl\(' 
lerlll "t'nfon"'IIlt'nt 1Il'lion" liS ma'" in 
article 53 means something differt'nt 
than the "preventive ... action" or the 
"preventive and enforcement measures" 
ust'd elsewhere. 
The answt'r to a part of this confu-
sion very prohably lies in the differenti-
ation set forth in articles 41 and 42 of 
the types of processes which can be 
undertaken by the Security Council. 
Article 41 provides for "measures not 
involving the usc of armed force" to be 
utilized to effect Srcurity Council deci-
siems. Arti,'I,' ,1·2, on tilt' otllt'r hand. 
p,'rlllits "at'! ion hy lIir. S"lI lind 1:11111 
fon'('s" if lilt' 1Il,'aSlIn'S of artiel .. ·1-1 ,!rI' 
not considert'd lIdt'quate. \I "Ill'!', it 
wOllld logically follow' that tht' It'rlll 
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"ac·tion" should he interpret!!(1 liS 1It:-
companied hy tilt' us,' of lIrJ1l1'd force 
while the terlll "measures" would not. 
While this ·does give a key to the 
differentiation between "preventive and 
enforcement measures" and "preventive 
and enforcement actions," viz, the 
presence of the usc of armed force in 
the latter, there still remains the prob-
lem that article 53 only prohibits a 
regional organization from taking "en-
forcement" and not "preventive" action 
without the authorization of the Se-
curity Council. No clue has been un-
covered which would give any assistance 
to a resolution of this problem. Never-
theless, it is a fact that the charter 
speaks of four different types of 
proct'sscs which may he taken hy the 
Security Council, and it denies only one 
of these-enforcement action-to a re-
f!ional organization without its first 
securing Security Council approval. 
Thus it is concluded that nothing in the 
charter prohibits a regional organization 
from taking, without Security Council 
authorization either: 
(1) preventive measures; 
(2) prevmltive action; or 
(:J) enforcement nWlIsures. 
This nliturlilly rais,'s lIlt' 1}\I('stion of 
tl\(' dil'l"'I't'ntialion hI'! w,','n Ih,' ntij('t'-
tives "preventiv,'" lind "t'nfon:eJlll!nt." 
A logical explanation appears in the 
provisions of articles 41 and "·2 10 the 
dfect that the measures or actions 
which they contemplate arc to be em-
ployed to give effect to the "decisions 
of the Security Council "-decisions 
which hllve been taken under article 39 
to "maintain or restore international 
peace and security." Enforcement mea-
sures or action, therefore, arc preceded 
by a determination either that a "threat 
to the peace" or a "breach of the 
P";I('('" t'xists anti t hut it mllst h,' d .. all 
wilh ill n ,·,'rlnin nlllnnt'r. 11"IIt·,,, IInv 
m,'a:mre or al'lion takt'n unt!,'r nrtide ,1:1 
or 42 is either an (,lIforccmcllt measure 
or all (,lIforc('m(,lIt aetioll, gilll~'~ iL ig 
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taken to place in effect, or to enforce, a 
decision of the Security Council con-
cerning how the threat or actual breach 
should he settled. 
A' totaIly different situation exists 
where there is neither a "threat to the 
peace" nor a "breach of the peace" but 
where, nevertheless, there is a situation 
which could mature into such if outside 
assistance is not brought to bear. This is 
the "prevention ... of threats to the 
peace" spoken of in article 1(1), giving 
rise to the obviously contemplated need 
for "preventive" actions or "preventive" 
measures. Since these types of processes 
are not prohibited to a regional organi-
zation, it must be concluded that thcy 
are properly matters for regional compe-
tence under arLicle 52. The above analy-
sis, therefore, would support the fol-
lowing types of actions by a regional 
organization without Security Council 
authorization: 
Preventive measures-not in-
volving the use of armed force; 
Preventive action-involving 
the use of armed force; and 
Enforcement measures-not 
involving thc use of armed force. 
It is recognized that the ahove 
rea~oning nmy ~eem to Ill' an \IIulllly 
technical and tortuous attcmpt to inter· 
pr!!t into thc charter an unintended 
competence in regional organizations. 
However this may be, it seems ohvious 
that a start down this tortuous path is 
already well under way. This has heen 
occasioned by the unwiJIingness of the 
powers to entrust disputes in which 
they are interested to the veto·bound 
Security Council and by the resultant 
inahility of the Security Councir to 
furnish the "effective collective" substi-
tute for unilateral self-help which it 
promised. 
The Palestine Case (I9·m). Thitt 
was first seen in the Syrian attempt to 
justify the Arab actions in the hostilities 
which hroke out almost immediately 
after the State of Isracl was cstahlished 
in 11)4~t It was argued Lhat the illLerven-
tion of the Arab StuLes in Palestine was 
taken under the authority of article 52 
of the charter. Since the Arab League 
was a recognized regional organization, 
it was within its competence to seek a 
pacific settlement of the local situation 
in its area. This argument was met with 
the adamant rehuLLal hy the United 
StaLes that the Arau League's acLions 
were in the nature of "enforcement 
actions" and that such were prohibited 
without first securing the authorization 
of the Security CounciI.44 
The Dominican Republic Case 
(1960·61). This issue was again debated 
in the Security Council in connection 
with the sanctions imposed on the 
Dominican Repuhlic by the members of 
the OAS in .late 1960. At the Sixth 
l\1eeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, the members of the 
OAS, acting coIlectively, condemned 
the Dominican Republic for acts of 
intervention and aggression against 
Venczuela. I t was resolved that the 
mcmbers of the OAS should apply hoth 
diplomatic and economic sanctiolls 
a~ainf;t the ])olllinil~all HI'pllhlil~.4 5 
Th(,~I' ad ions w,t'rt' rl'porlt~" to I III! 
L' • (' '1 4 t; '1'1 S . ll' L'ecunty .OUIICI. Ie ,0Vlct 111011 
promptly submitted a draft resolution 
under whieh the Security Council would 
have specifically approved the action of 
the OAS.47 In support of his draft 
resolution, the Soviet representative ex-
pressed complete agreement with the 
actions taken by the OAS but insisted 
that the actions taken were "enforce-
ment actions" within the meaning of 
article 53, and that, as such, they 
required the authorization of the Se-
curity CounciI.48 This has heen astutely 
terllled a "shrewd ta!'licalmovl~" 011 the 
part of till' Sovit'l Union, shu'l' it ttou~ht 
"to ctttahlish the compelt'lIt:l' of the 
Security Council to control the applica-
tion of enforcement measures by the 
OA8, hy advO!:atin{.1: the approval. not 
tIlt' rt'jrl:tion, of OAS action in the 
initial casc:>4 9 
The memhers of the OAS who were 
sitting on the Security Council were 
quick to reco~nize the purpm;e hchind 
this Soviet move. The rcprescntative of 
Argentina ohserved: 
The Soviet view is that, undcr 
Article 53 of the Charter, the 
Security Council is competent to 
approve the steps recently taken 
by the Organization of American 
States with regard to one of its 
members. A t the same time it is 
clear that, a rOlltrnrio .~CllSIl. the 
Sovirt view also implies that the 
Security Council is entitled to 
annul or revise these measures if it 
sees fit. 50 
Argentina did not feel that it was 
necessary for the Security Council to 
take a position on this Soviet view and, 
in conjunction with Ecuador and the 
United Statrs, suhmitted a suhstitute 
draft resolution under which the Se-
curity Council would simply take note 
of the actions of the OAS. 1 
The United States, arguing in support 
of the suhstitute draft resolution, stated 
simply that the mcasures taken hy the 
OAS were entirely within the authority 
o( a regional organization, since any of 
the actions being taken collectively 
"could he taken individually hy any 
sovereign statl' on its own initiative."5 2 
Strong support for this positioll was 
giVI'1i hy VI'nezurla,53 China,54 and the 
United Kingdom. The latter's r('presen-
tative gave this analysis of the situation: 
... it is the view of my dclegation 
that when Article 5:~ refers to 
"rnforcemcnt action," it must he 
cOl1trlllplatinl! thr cXl'rci~r of 
fon:I' in 1I n1:I11I1I'r whidl wllulll 
not nnrJll"I\~ hI' h'gitilll:ltl' for ;lIIY 
Stah' or group of States (''(C('pt 
IIllCh'r the authority of thl' 
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Security Coulleil. Other pacifying 
a!'liolls UIIII('r rl'giollal nrrnllgl'-
ments lIS envis;lged under Chnpter 
VIII of the Charter which do not 
come into this category have 
simply to he hrought to the atten-
tion oC the Security Council under 
Article 54.5 5 
Other members of the Security Council 
were not ready to go quite so far. 
Several expressed the view that the term 
"enforcement action" was ambiguous 
and required further study so that its 
meaning could he determined. It was 
their feeling, however, that this particu-
lar case could he disposed of without 
making this determination. 
Only Poland lent its support fully to 
the Soviet position. The remainder of 
the Security Council either fclt that 
there was no need to determine if the 
actions of the OAS were, in fact, "en-
forcement actions" or that they did not 
constitute such actions. 
The three-power substitute draft was 
put to a votc and carried hy a vote of 9 
to 0, with Poland and the Soviet Union 
abstaining. 
Two conflicting opinions of the 
effect of this vote have been put for-
wnrti. The first, thnt of John C. Dreirr, 
is that: 
By adopting the American alterna-
tive rather than the Soviet pro-
posal, nnd thus nvoiding any for-
mal upproval or disapproval of the 
OAS action, the Security Council 
in effect endorsed the view held 
by the Sixth Mceting of Foreign 
Ministers: that authorization of 
the Security Council was not 
necessary. An important prece-
dent was thereby established. 5 6 
On the other hand, Professor . .Inis L. 
Claudl'. Jr .. ('ontpnlls th;lt, hl'l'uusr of 
tIll' 1I\II'l'rtuinty I:X prl'ssl'll by IIllln)' 
1III'l1\be[:; eonerrning the validity of tht' 
leglll p08ition advnnced hy the United 
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States, the Council's action "hardly 
represented a decisive endorsement of 
the proposition that thc authorization 
of the Security Council is not required 
for OAS sanctions "falling short of mili-
tary force. ,,57 
I t is this author's view that the 
opinions expressed by Mr. John C. 
Dreier represent the more reasonable 
analysis. While it may he true, as Pro-
fessor Claude asserts. that some mem-
bers of the Security Council were un-
willing to directly support the U.S. legal 
posiLion on the meaning of the Lerm 
"enforcement ac~ion," it remains a fact 
that in their vote for the substitute 
resolution they lent their effective sup-
port to this proposition. The effect of 
the adoption of this rcsolution-par-
ticularly in the context within which it 
was dehatl'd-is that Security Council 
approval of thl' type of action taken hy 
the OAS is /lot required. All memlH'rs 
had an opporLunity Lo vote for the 
Soviet-sponsored approval, and their 
decision to vote instead on the suhsti-
tute draft must be interpret('d as a 
decision that it was preferable Lo Lhe 
Soviet draft, Lhat vote on the Sovi(,t 
draft was not desirahl(), ancl, hl'nce, Lhat 
approval of the OAS aelion was not 
necl':;sary . 
TllI'rt' is no question hut Ihat Iht' 
handlill/! of Ihis casl' hy the SecuriLy 
Council has set a significant precedcnt 
leading toward the emancipaLion of 
regional organizations from a restrictive 
inll'rpretalion of artielc ;';1. And Ihig ig 
as it should hI'. Collective sanctiong hy a 
regional organizaLion should h() per-
missihle if such sanctions are noL in 
conflict with some provision of the 
charter. Certainly collective sanctions, 
which would be lawful if taken unilater-
ally, should fall within the authorized 
catl'gory of regional al'tions. In this 
n'/!ard the followin/! ohsl'n"ation of tht' 
Thoma:','s i:, p,'rtin,'nt: ..... tlll'n' i,. 
not hin/! in till' Chart"., I hal would pro· 
hihit a :::tat" from applyin/! :::anl'liong 
IlIIihltl'rally against anotlll'r staLe so long 
as under Article 2. Paragraph 4, such 
sanctions do noL involve a thrcaL or usc 
of force. ,,5 8 
The significance of Lhc Security 
Council's resoluLion of this case lies in 
Lhc fact that iLs determinaLion was, in 
effect, a determinaLion that the non-
forceful measures Laken by the OAS 
were similar to those non forceful mea-
sures outlined in arLicle 41 of the 
charter and that they were not "en-
forcement actions," huL raLher were 
"enforcement measllres." As such, Lhey 
lie within the competence of a regional 
organization, in accordance wiLh thc 
analysis set forth above. 
The Cuban Casc (J anuary-
February 1962). The dccisions takcn in 
the Dominiellll Rrpuhlic ea~e wcrl' sLiII 
fresh in thc milld~ of the membcrs of 
the Sl'curiLy Council when, in early 
I ()()2, Lhc question of the legiLimaey of 
actions of the OAS again came inlo 
prominence. In January 19()2 Lhe 
EighLh l\leeLing of Consultation of 
MinisLrrs of Foreign Affairs, in a mect-
ing held at Punlc del EsLl', passed a 
s()ries of r('soluLions suspending Cuha 
from Ilw OAS and impoHinr partial eeonomic sanctions on her: 9 Culm 
ont'(' a/!ain soughl IInilt'd Nalions assis· 
liltll'('. SIll' firsl purslIl'd IlI'r l'olllplainls, 
tlin'cled l'ssenlially a~ainsl Ihl' II ni\('d 
SLates, in tlw Gcneral Assembly, AfLer 
more than 2 wecks of dcbatc~, however, 
Lhe Gl'neral A~sl'l\Ihly oVl'rwhellllin~ly 
refused lo lakl' any aclion.(·o ellha Lillm 
appt'aled to the Security Council Lo hear 
iLs case, uuL the Security Council re-
fused to place the Cuban complaints on 
its agenda, essenLially because the mat-
ler had been fully dcbated in the Gen-
eral Assembly.61 [n the dehatcs pre-
ceding this determination, it was ouvi-
ous that many members of the Sccurity 
COlIIll'il l'onsirl('rl'd llll' Cuhan ('0111-
plaint::: as nolhin~ ilion' Ihan a n'I'lI:::t or 
th,' I ()hll I )olllini":1II Hl'JlIIhlil' iSSIJI'. mill 
al 1,'asL the Unitcd SLall's, the United 
Kingdolll, Chi"" and Venezuela 
considered that the preeedent l:wt in that 
cnse rmldercd a rediscus~i()n of the i&:ue 
unnecessary. 
On B ~lareh 1962, Cuha took a new 
tack.' Now she requested the Security 
Council to seck an ndvisory opinion 
from the lnternntionnl Court of Justice 
concerning whether or not the measures 
taken against her by the OAS were 
"enforcement actions" which were 
within the competence of that organiza-
tion without its first obtaining Security 
Council approval.62 The dehates on this 
Cuhan request consumed seven full 
meetings of thc Council, extending from 
14 to 22 March.63 E~entially the same 
positions were asserted in these debates 
as had been in the two prior dehates on 
this issue. This time, however, the 
United States found far greater support 
for its position that the actions under-
taken hy the OAS were not "enforce-
ment actions" within the meaning of 
article 53 than it had in the Dominican 
Republic case. France,64 China,6s the 
United Kingclom,66 Irefand,67 Chile,68 
and V enezuela6 9 all expre~ed e~ential 
concurrence with the U.S. interprcta-
tion. The Soviet Union found support 
only from Cuha, a norunemher of the 
Security Council, tlw United Arah 
Republic, and Rumania. The dC'legnlC' 
from Ghana ('''pre&:ed a willinglll'ss to 
hnve the maUC'r heard hy the In t(,rIIn-
tional Court since he did not feci that 
the debates in the Dominican R(:puhlic 
ca~e demonstrated a c1(~ar drawing mill 
determination of the issue.7o After ex-
haustive debates, the Security Counc:i1 
rejected the Cuban proposal by a vote 
of 7 to 4.71 
Professor Claude describes the n'sult 
of this ease as follows: "Far more 
genuinely than the Dominican case, the 
Cuban case in its l\larch 1962 phase 
constituted a substantial victory for the 
United States demand that the Security 
Council II(' debarred from exercising 
control ov('r tl\(' I'nforccnumt aetivitiC's 
of the OAS. ,,72 f t is true that these two 
cases, taken together, constitute a rather 
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t:ollll'l'IIing interpn'lati(lll of L1w It'rm 
""nforcenu:nt m:lioll ,. as lIot including 
those mensurt!s seL fm·th in article ·1.\ of 
the chartl·r. It would seem, however, 
that Professor Claude's insistence that 
this interpretation was taken because of 
the U.S. "demand" is unfair. It may just 
he, contrary to the critical thesis 
adopted hy Professor Claude, that this 
interpretation was adopted by large 
majorities of the SC'curity Council be-
cause it was the correct one. Certainly, 
it was forcefully argued by many states 
other than the United States, and essen-
tially hy those states which were inter-
ested in preserving what they considered 
to be the reasonable authorities of a 
regional organization to handle local 
disputes in a pacific manner, free from a 
possiblt~ big power veto. Universalists 
may dislike what they see emerging 
from the Dominican Republic and 
Cuban cases, but, once again, it reflects 
nothing more than the desire of states 
to seck some workable collective system 
for resolving disputes. If the veto-bound 
Security Council cannot provide this 
system, states must he expected to look 
elsewhere. 
The dangers inherent in this de-
parture from universalism, however, 
wcrl' dramaticlIlly outlined hy the repre-
l'enlative of tIll' SoviC't lInion in the 
discussions of the Cuhan queslion. In 
clearly prophetic terms, he stated: 
If todOlY the Set:urity Couneil fllils 
to nullify the unlawful decisions 
thus taken against Cuba, then 
tomorrow similar action may he 
taken against any other cou"ntry 
of Latin America, Africa, Asia or 
any other continent whose neigh-
hors, upon some pretext or an-
other, having assembled at a re-
gional meeting, arbitrarily decide 
to apply it to the machinery of 
eocrcion in th,· form of ('nforcc-
ment action, thus usurping the 
prerogatives of the Security Coun-
cil. 73 
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The Cuban Quarantine (Octo-
ber 1962). On 22 October 1962, Presi-
dent John F. Kennedy announced to 
the worId74 that the United States had 
imposed a "strict quarantine" on all 
offensive weapons to Cuba, including 
nuclear missiles which were being in-
stalled in that country by the Soviet 
Union. Almost immediately thereafter 
the Council of the Organization of 
American States met in its capacity as 
the Provisional Consultative Organ 
under the Rio Treaty, at the request of 
the United States, and unanimously 
recommended to all members of the 
OAS that they take "all measures •.. in-
cluding the use of armed force ... " to 
prevent Cuba from continuing to receive 
military supplies from the Sino·Soviet 
powers which may threaten the peace 
and security of the Americas and "to 
prevent the missiles in Cuba with offen-
sive capability from ever becoming an 
active threat to the ~eace and security 
of the Continent."7 The quarantine 
became effective at 1000, Wednesday, 
24 October, and was enforced by hun-
dreds of U.S. planes and ships and 
several from other members of the 
OAS.76 For the first time since the 
1947 Palestine case, a regional organiza-
tion had resorted to the use of force. 
It is not the intention of this paper 
to debate the legality of the a!'liong 
taken by the United States and hy the 
O/\S. This has he en argued at length hy 
many.77 It is important to not(', how-
ever, that the official U.S. and OAS 
justifications for their actions were 
hased, not on the self-defensive provi-
sions of article 51 which most puhlicists 
seem to prefer, but rather on the au-
thority of a regional organization to 
deal with matters relating to the main-
tenance of international peace and se-
curity under articles 52 and 53. 
·\t tIlt> urgent requests of the llnited 
States, the Soviet lInion, and Cuha. th(' 
~t'eurit v Council C(lllvt'll<'d Oil :2:~ (le-
toht'r i I)h2 to con::idt'r tilt' ::ituation. 
The gravity and urgency of the situation 
prevented any genuine dehate over the 
legalities involved. I t was contended, of 
course, that the actions of the United 
States in effecting a "blockade" of Cuba 
were flagrant violations of international 
law and should he condemned as 
sueh.78 Ambassador Stevenson of the 
United States, although terming the 
OAS actions as "defensive measures 
taken by the American Republics to 
'protect the Western Hemisphere against 
long-range Soviet nuclear missiles," did 
not find it necessary to debate the 
legality of this issue in view of the 
initiatives of the U.N. Secretary General 
to mediate the dispute.79 Neither the 
United States nor other OAS members 
had any difficulty, however, in finding 
ample authority in hoth the Charter of 
the United Nations and in the Charter 
of the Organization of American States 
for their actions.8o Only one memher 
of the Security Council contended that 
the OAS actions were "enforcement 
actions" which were improper without 
Security Council authorization. In 
arguing on this point, the representative 
of Ghana stated: 
... if it is recalled that the United 
States delegation, in previous de-
hat('s, had exprt'ssed the view that 
enforcement adion con::ists of 
co('reive mea::un's involvinl! lhn 
use of air, sea or land forces, of 
the type falling within the scope 
of Artidn 42, tillm it is "'('ar lhat 
the action cOlltemplated by the 
United States must be regarded as 
enforcement aetion, which is in-
admissihle in terms of Article 53, 
without the authorization of the 
Security CounciL81 
As noted above, however, the ma-
chinery of the Security Council proved 
inarlt'quate to a solution of this conflict 
IlI'tw('t'lI the two ::upt~rpowt'r". Con::e· 
I1tH'lIlly. no at'lion was lakt'n whit,h 
t'ould Ill' inll'rpn'lt'd as lIlakilll! a rl'solu-
tion of Ihis Ghanaian argument. I nstt'ad, 
the Secretary General undertook media-
tion of the dispute directly between the 
powers involved, and, as history re-
.counts, the dispute was resolved by 
removal of the Soviet missiles from 
Cuba and by the Soviet agreement to 
discontinue any further shipments. The 
naval quarantine was lifted on 20 No-
vember 1962.82 
In an address made on 3 November 
1962, Mr. Abram Chayes, the Legal 
Advisor to the Department of State, 
outlined the official U.S. legal rationale 
for the Cuhan quarantine.83 Mr. 
Chayes' essential position was that the 
fundamental authority for the OAS 
action was contained in articles 6 and 8 
of the Rio Treaty, which provide for 
collective action, including the usc of 
armed force, in the case of an armed 
attack and in the situation where any 
An1l'rican state is threatencd hy an 
"aggression which is not an armed at-
tack ... or by any other fact or situa-
tion that might endanger the peace of 
America." Regarding the use of force in 
implementation of the quarantine, Mr. 
Chayes likened the collective procedures 
of the OAS to those of the United 
Nations and argued that the "assent" of 
the parties, including Cuba, to the pro-
visions of the OAS Charter and the Rio 
Pact, to~ether with the established col-
lective proccdurcs, legitimizcs "thc usc 
of forcc in accordancc with the OAS 
resolution dealing with a threat to thc 
peace in the hemisphere."84 Although 
this argument may appear questionable, 
the political rationale which underlies it 
does not. Mr. Chayes said: 
... the drafters of the Charter 
demonstrated their wisdom by 
making Security Council respon-
sibility for dealing with threats to 
the peacc "primary" and not 
"exclusive." For events since 
1945 have demonstrated that the 
Security Council, like our own 
electoral college, was not a viable 
institution. The veto has made it 
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substantially useless in keeping 
the peace. 
The withering away of the 
Security Council has led· to a 
search for alternative peacekeep-
ing institutions. In the United 
Nations itself the General As-
sembly and the Secretary-General 
have filled the void. Regional 
organizations are another obvious 
candidate.85 
Not until April 1963 did Mr. Chayes 
undertake to provide an answer to the 
Ghanaian argument that the OAS ac-
tions were "enforcement actions" im-
permissible under article 53 of the 
charter.86 In so doing, \1r. Chayes 
commented on the gradual narrowing 
by the Security Council of thosc provi-
sions of article 5:3( L), dealing with 
enforcement action. He interpreted the 
actions of the Security Council in the 
1960 Dominican Republic case and in 
the January-February 1962 Cuban case 
as indicating a retroactive approval by 
the Security Council of "enforcement 
actions" taken by the OAS against those 
statcs. This, he explained, resulted from 
the refusal of the Security Council to 
condemn those actions. Thus, he ·as-
scrted, it is not necessary to obtain prior 
approval of tl\(~ Sceurity Council to 
Icgitimize an enforcement action. It is 
enough that the Security Council fails 
to disapprove them. 
This is an unfortunate argument, 
indeed, since it plainly overlooks the 
position advocated by the United States 
throughout both of these prior cases 
that the OAS actions were not enforce-
ment actions. 87 
There is no question that the OAS 
implementation of the Cuban quaran-
tine involved action by sea and air 
forces so as to hring it within the 
meaning of the term "action" as used in 
the "enforcement action" of article 5:3, 
and there is no question but that the 
argument advanced by Mr. Chayes that 
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prior approval for a regional enforce-
ment action need not be obtained must 
be rejected. This does not mean, how-
ever, that the charter prohibits the 
action taken. Reference to the two 
documents establishing the quarantine 
will show clearly that it was taken not 
as an "enforcement action" as that term 
is used in article 53(2), but rather as a 
"preventive" action coming within the 
com~etence of a regional organiza-
tion. 8 In the Presidential proclamation 
announcing the quarantine, President 
Kennedy stated that the Congress of the 
United States had declared that the 
United States "is determined to pre-
vent . .. Cuba from extending by force 
or the threat of force, its aggressive or 
subversive activities to any part of this 
hemisphere, and to prevent in Cuba the 
creation or use of an externally sup-
ported m~litary capabili.ty endange~~n? 
the security of the Umted States .. 8 
Similarly, the OAS resolution calling for 
the quarantine sought to ensure that 
Cuba "cannot continue to re-
ceive ... [military materiel] ... which 
may threaten the peace and security of 
the Continent and to prevent the mis-
siles in Cuba with offensive capability 
from ever becoming an active threat to 
the peace and security of the conti-
t 
,,90 nen. 
It seems obviom: that both tlw PreRi-
dent and the Council of the OAS were 
saying that the actions to be taken were 
"preventive" acti~ns spoken of in article 
1(1), of the charter-actions which are 
not prohibited to a regional organiza-
tion by the provisions of article 53(2). 
The Dominican Republic Case 
(1965). The next, and the last, in this 
series of OAS actions was the crisis in 
the Dominican Republic which com-
menced in April 1965. 
I t will be remembered that during 
tlw course of a relwllion in the Domini-
can Republic in late A pril, the A lIleriCiln 
Amhassador in the Dominican Republic 
reported that the Dominican authorities 
had stated that they "could no longer 
control the situation, that American and 
foreign lives were in desperate danger 
and that outside forces were re-
quired.,,91 On the evening of 28 April 
1965, in response to an urgent appeal 
from the U.S. Ambassador, President 
Johnson announced the landing of 400 
U.S. Marines in these words: 
I have ordered the Secretary of 
Defense to put the necessary 
American troops ashore in order 
to give protection to hundreds of 
Americans who are still in the 
Dominican Republic and to escort 
them safely back to this country. 
The same assistance will be avail-
able to the nationals of other 
countries, some of whom have 
already asked for our help.92 
In a television address to the nation 
on 2 May 1965, President Johnson 
reiterated the necessity for the landing 
of American troops for the protection 
of American nationals. He went further, 
however, and explained that the re-
sources of the Organization of American 
States were now active in seeking a 
solution to the Dominican problem. lie 
explained that the "revolutionary move-
ment had taken a tragic turn" and thnt 
CornmuniHt leadc~rs had tak('11 inCf(~aHc~cJ 
control. He thereafter effectively modi-
fied the U.S. purpose in retaining its 
forces in the Dominican Republic in the 
following words: "The American na-
tions cannot, must not, and will not 
permit the estahlishment of another 
communist government in the Western 
Hemisphere. ,,93 
The Dominican situation first came 
to the official attention of the OAS on 
27 April 1965, when the United States 
requested a meeting of the Inter-
American Peace Committee to consider 
the prohlem.94 On 28 April the OAS 
waR informed of the Amcrican dcdsion 
to land troops, and a special meeting of 
the OAS Council was conv('ncd on the 
afternoon of that same day. On 30 April 
the first significant OAS action was 
taken-a resolution calling for a cease-
fire and for a neutral zone of refuge in 
Santo Domingo.95 On I May the OAS 
established a special five-member com-
mittee to go to the Dominican Republic 
and to offer its good offices in media-
tion of the dispute and to assist in the 
reestablishment of peace and order. On 
() May the OAS acted to create an 
Inter-American Peace Force, composed 
of contingents from those OAS member 
states capable of providing them and to 
operate in the Dominican Republic, 
under the following guidance. 
This Force will have as its sole 
purpose, in a spirit of democratic 
impartiality, that of cooperating 
in thc restoration of normal con-
ditions in the Dominican Rcpuh-
Iic, in maintaining the security of 
its inhabitants and the inviola-
hility of human rights, ancl in the 
estahlishment of an atmosphere of 
peace and conciliation that will 
permit the functioning of demo-
cratic institutions.96 
This force, consisting ultimately of 
approximately 20,000 troops, came into 
being on 2:J !\Iay 19()!i. It was com-
prised of forces from five OAS member 
states97 and was commanded by a 
Brazilian glmeraI. 98 
During the course of these events, 
the Security Council held lengthy and 
acrimonious debates over what was 
termed the "armed intervention by the 
United States in the internal affairs of 
the Dominican Repuhlic99 ... in viola-
tion of the fundamental principles of 
the United Nations Charter and the 
universally recognized rules of interna-
tional law.,,1 00 Amhassador Stevenson, 
on 3 \lay I 96!i, stressed that the Or-
ganization of American States "lllIs for 
!'everal days heen dealing with the situa-
tion and has made substantial prog-
ress.,,1 0 1 Although he pointedly 
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argued, as had President Johnson in his 
2 i\lay aqdress, that the A merican states 
wert! unwilling to "permit thl' estahlish-
ment of another Communist Govern-
ment in the western hemisphere,,,1 02 
he stressed that the initial U.S. motiva-
tion was to provide needed protection 
to its nationals. He then outlined the 
ultimate U.S. purpose as the: "re-
establishment of constitutional govern-
ment and, to that end, to assist in 
maintaining the stability essential to the 
expression of the free ehoice of the 
Dominican people.,,1 03 The argument 
was stridently advanced that the actions 
of the United States could receive no 
color of legality hy clothing them with 
the authority of the OAS. 1 t was argued 
again, as it had been during the 19()2 
Cuhan crisis, that the OAS had no 
authority to resort to the use of foree in 
tlH' seLLlelllent of a regional dispute 
without first obtaining the approval of 
the Security Council, and condemnation 
of the action of hoth the United States 
and the OAS was soughl.104 Notwith-
standing these arguments, the Security 
Council ultimately took no aelion to 
condemn the activities of either the 
United States or the OAS. It did, 
however, enact two resolutions calling 
for cl'ase-fires l 05 and inviting the Seerl'-
tary C; 1'11t'rlll to 51'1111 a rl'prl'Hlmtllt iVt' to 
the Dominican Republic to n'port to 
tlH' SI~curity Council on the situation. 
l\lr. JO!'I' A. I\lavohl"l' llimost inllnedi-
ately was dispat~hed by the Secretary 
General, and through the medium of his 
periodic reports the Security Council 
was kept advised of the Dominican 
developments.106 Both the United Na-
tions and the OAS thereafter main-
tained a presence in the Dominican 
Repuhlic, although not without some 
conflict; 07 until the crisis was ulti-
matl'ly brought under control. 
Tht' Dominican Hepuhlie case must 
hI' hrokt'n down into its two sl~parate 
aspects-first, the initial, unilateral land-
ing of troops hy the Unitt'd States for 
the protection of its nationals; and 
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secondly, the retention of those troops 
in the country, augmented by troops 
from other OAS member states, under 
OAS auspices. 
The first of these, although con-
demned b~ many, 1 08 has been justified 
by others 09 as a legitimate exercise of 
unilateral self-defense or unilateral for-
cible self-help for humanitarian pur-
poses. Whatever may be one's position 
in this controversy, it must be conceded 
that it is much less difficult to find a 
legal rationale for what was certainly a 
necessary but limited action to save 
human lives than it is to justify the 
subsequent substantial and prolonged 
presence of American and OAS 
troOps.ll0 
There is little doubt that this latter 
action stemmed primarily, if not totally, 
from the fear of the United States, 
conveyed with conviction to at least 
two-thirds of the states in the OAS, that 
Communist forces had taken over 
leadership of the Dominican rebellion 
and that there was a definite danger that 
they would succeed in capitalizing on 
the turmoil and in establishing a Com-
munist government in that country. 
This fear, voiced by both Ambassador 
Stevenson and President Johnson, 111 
has led some prominent Americans to 
conclude that it was the motivatinf 
force behind thc initial U.S. actions. 1 I 
Whether or not this criticism is justified 
is difficult to say, but it is perfectly 
clear that only a few short days after 
the crisis erupted this did become the 
principal, if not the sole, U.S. and OAS 
motivation. The purpose for which the 
OAS Inter-American Peace Force was 
created-" cooperating in the restoration 
of normal conditions in the Dominican 
Republic ... and in the establishment 
of an atmosphere of peace and concilia-
tion that wiII permit the functioning of 
democratic inslitutions"-makcs this 
conl'iusion in('scapahl,'. 
The \)ominil'lI11 l'risis TI'pn's"lItc'li thl' 
epitome of what has hl'en called thc 
('ffort of the United States to seck 
"from the Inter-Amcrican system 'the 
legitimacy of multilateralism,' or to put 
it more simply, an OAS label for her 
hemispheric policies. »113 This process 
was well on its way when, in 1954, the 
OAS adopted the Caracas Resolution 
condemning the intervention of interna-
tional communism in inter-American 
affairs and declaring that: 
... the domination of control of 
the political institutions of any 
American State by the interna-
tional communist movement, 
extending to this Hemisphere the 
political system of an extra-
continental power, would consti-
tute a threat to the sovereignty 
and political independence of the 
American States, endangering the 
peace of America, and would call 
for a Meeting of Consultation to 
'consider the adoption of appropri-
ate action in accordance with ex-
. . t' 114 Istmg trea 1es. 
This resolution, adopted at the insis-
tence of the United States, was widely 
regarded as a "revivification of the 
Monroe Doctrine, shifted from a uni-
lateral to Ta multilateral axis, and di-
rected agamst Communism rather than 
Colonialism. »115 It is a fair comment 
that thc provisions of this resolution 
have I)(~en the principal ha!lill for U.s. 
hemispheric policy since 1954. Indeed, 
it has been said that the switch of the 
United States to a policy of regionalism 
was designed to ensure its ability to 
fight communism in the Western Hemi-
sphere unimpaired by the Soviet 
veto.116 This was certainly borne out in 
the Cuban cases discussed above and in 
the Dominican crisis of 1965. Whether 
or not, howevcr, the Caracas Resolution 
provides any legal basis for this lattcr 
action, and specifically for thc military 
intervention by the OAS, is quite an-
oth('r mall('r. I t could III~ IIr~lI('d. of 
c'oursc" liS iii)!,!! I'rofl'lIsor It'ulk. t hut: 
The appropriate institution for 
partisan supranational action is Lo 
be found in the regional level. 
Here the stabilizing value of politi-
cal homogeneity for a group of 
closely related states favors a 
political use of regional organiza-
tion even though this may involve 
on occasions a betrayal of the 
ideals of national self-determina-
tion .•.. It is unfortunate in many 
respects to compel dissenting 
national communities to conform 
to regional political preferences, 
but it may be indispensable for 
the maintenance of minimum con-
ditions of international sta-
biIity.117 
This argument, however, does not pro-
vide any legal basis, under current inter-
national law, for the actions taken by 
the OAS in the Dominican case. At 
most, it provides a tenuous political 
rationale. 
Professor Fenwick offers what is 
perhaps the best legal rationale, as fol-
lows: 
In the past riot and disorder have 
as a rule not been considered 
sufficiently important to consti-
tute a threat justifying interven-
tion. But I would ~ay today that if 
a revolution should hrcak out in 
one country or another, the Or-
ganization of American States 
would he justified in doing what it 
could to prevent a civil war. The 
days of civil war are over. You 
cannot have a civil war today 
without disturbing the peace, cer-
tainly not in America. Conse-
quently, I interpret the Rio 
Treaty, Article 6, where it speaks 
of a threat to the peace, in a 
broader sense than it would have 
been interpreted 50 years 
ago .•.. J 18 
It is trut' that "You cannot have a civil 
war today without disturbing the peace, 
certainly not in America," and, cer-
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tainly not if thai civil war appears to be 
Communist inspired. If such a situation 
creates a breach of international peace 
and security or threatens to create such 
a breach, it would be appropriate for 
the cognizant regional organization to 
seek its settlement. But it would seem, 
if the purposes of the charter are not to 
be tortured to undue lengths, that the 
modes of regional settlement should be 
short of the use of armed force. Never-
theless, the OAS did resort to the use of 
armed force, and there was a steadfast 
refusal of the Security Council to take 
any action other than to itself seek 
resolution of the dispute. One can only 
conclude that this refusal of the Se-
curity Council to condemn the action of 
the OAS must be considered to have at 
least added the color of legality to it. In 
terms of actions lawful for a regional 
organization to take, in accordance with 
the discussion set forth previously, 
therefore, it can only be described as a 
"preventive action" involving the use of 
armed force. 
The Czechoslovakia Case 
(August 1968). This chronicle of events 
could not be concluded without at least 
a brief discussion of the Soviet and 
Warsaw Pact military intervention in 
\.zeehoslovakia in late A IIgUAt 19()B. It 
was precisely this event which has 
driven home, with startling drama, the 
dangers inherent in the positions taken 
by the United Stales and most other 
OAS member states in the series of 
inter-American actions diseussed above. 
During the late evening of 20 August 
1968, massive movements of Warsaw 
Pact troops into Czechoslovakia com-
menced. Participating were units from 
the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, East Ger-
many, Hungary, and Poland.119 Before 
these movements were concluded, over 
'100,000 Warsaw Pact troops were tlc-
ploYl'd in Czerho!'lovllkill, Ot'cul'yill~ 
strategic positions and maintaining ef-
fective foreign military contr01 through-
out the country. 
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On 21 August, six memiwrs of tl\(~ 
Security Council-Canada, FnlJl('e, Para-
guay, the United Kingdom, and tlw 
United States-requested an urgent 
meeting of the Council to consider this 
situation, which was described as an 
armed intervention contrary to the pro-
visions of the charter. 1 2 0 The debates 
on this issue in the Security Council 
compare favorably with any ever hcld in 
invective and acrimony, accusation and 
counteraccusation, and in political, 
rather than legal, overtones. Neverthe-
less, there were claims of illegality by 
almost all members of the Security 
Council, claims which branded the 
Soviet and Warsaw Pact action as an 
unlawful intervention in the internal 
affairs of a sovereign state12 1 av.d as a 
plain violation of the basic tenets of the 
charter, particularly article 2(1).122 
The delegate .from the Soviet Union 
answered these allegations with what 
must be considered his legal rationale 
for his country's actions, and as any 
astute student of international law 
could have predicted, his arguments did 
not appear too different from those 
advanced by the United States in the 
series of OAS actions discussed above. 
His first position was based on the 
jurisdictional issue. He asserted that no 
state affected by the Warsaw Paet action 
had requested the Security Council to 
discuss this maller and that, in any case, 
the "events in Czechoslovakia were a 
matter for the Czechoslovak people and 
the States of the Socialist community, 
linked together as they were hy com-
mon responsibilities, and for them 
alone. ,,1 2 ~ 
When this position was overruled and 
the Council proceeded to a debate of 
the substance of the matter, the Soviet 
representative then argued that "the 
decision of the Socialist countries to 
help the Czel'hoslovak IH'ople was fully 
l-()n~IlIHlllt with the riv:ht of p('upll-s to 
individual nnd l'olh-l'Iiw :;df·dl'f(-n~e as 
provided for in till' Charter and ... in 
the Warsaw Pact."1 2 4 He initially con-
tended that the inl!-rv('ntion was lIt tlw 
rl'l}llI~st of the Cz(-(-hoslovak (;ov(-rn-
mcnt, 125 hut wlwn this WlIS "ratll"~d as 
untrue by the Czechoslovak Govern-
ment itself,126 the argument was 
changed to state, in essence, that mem-
bers of the Warsaw Pact " •.. bore full 
responsibility" for the ~mity of the 
Socialist States and that the " .•• fra-
ternal countries firmly and resolutely 
opposed their unbreakable solidarity to 
any outside threat; nobody would ever 
be allowed to wrest a single link from 
the community of socialist states.,,1 2 7 
He thus contended that the "socialist 
community" had a right to prevent, by 
force, any infringement on that "(~om­
munity" and to prevent, hy force, any 
defection from that "community" by 
any member state. 
These arguments were strikingly un-
convincing. An eight-power draft resolu-
tion condemning the intervention and 
calling for the withdrawal of all inter-
vening forces was brought to a vote on 
23 August. It received a favorable vote 
of 10 members for to 2 against but was 
not adopted because of the negative 
vote of the Soviet Union which cast its 
105th veto to defeat the resolution. 
Although further debate was held, the 
Security Council took no action in the 
case and diseontill\\('d its consid('rlltion 
of the matter at the request of the 
Government of Czechoslovakia on 27 
August, when it appeared that bilateral 
negotiations between the Soviet Union 
and Czechoslovakia were progressing 
toward a solution of the crisis. 1 2'1! 
The Soviet legal rationale, which was 
really only hinted at in the Security 
Council debates, was expanded upon 
and further delineated in a Pravda ar-
ticle which appeared on 25 September 
1968.129 Later, in an address to the 
G(-11I'rnl t\~~I-lIIbly of tl1l' {Inill'd Nations 
on :~ Oe[olu-r, tl1l' Sovi(,t I"on'i~n 1\ Iinis-
tl-r, AIlIln-i A. (;rolllyko, (l"fille(1 thi!! 
rationale in UllIuistakably c1ellr terms. 
He said: 
The Soviet Union deems it lI('ces-
BUry to proclaim from this ros-
trum, too, that the socialist states 
cannot and will not allow a situa-
tion where the vital interests of 
socialism are infringed upon and 
encroachments are made on the 
inviolability of the boundaries of 
the socialist commonwealth and, 
therefore, on the foundations of 
international peace. 1 3 0 
The Soviet Union thus announced its 
own Monroe Doctrine and the Warsa-iv 
Pact its own Caracas Resolution. The 
Brezhnev Doctrine, which this has come 
to be called, 1 3 1 reasserts the familiar 
concept of a "socialist Commonwealth 
of Nations" but firmly rejects the tradi-
tional thesis that the "socialist Com-
monwealth" is constructed "on the 
basis of complete equality, respect for 
territorial integrity, national indepen-
dence and sovereignty and noninter-
ference in each other's affairs.,,1 32 The 
Brezhnev Doctrine clearly envisions not 
only the right, but the responsibility, of 
the Warsaw Pact nations to intervene in 
the affairs of any member state when 
the "integrity" of the socialist com-
munity as a whole is fdt to he threat-
ened. 
As starkly unlawful liB this lIlay St!em, 
it does not differ in principle from 
President Johnson's statement made 
during the Dominican Republic crisis of 
1965, that "the American nations can-
not, must not, and will not permit the 
establishment of another communist 
government in the Western Hemi-
sphere.,,1 3 3 This position, taken at the 
highest level in the U.S. Government in 
both the Dominican Republic and in 
other eases, deliberately rejected the 
Soviet warning given during the 1960-61 
Cuban crisis, which for sake of emphasis 
will be quoted here again: 
If tot/ay till' ~I'l'urity Council fails 
to nullify tIl!' unlawful decisions 
thus taken :Igainst Cuha, then 
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tomorrow similar udioll muy he 
tuken ugainst ully otll!'r country 
of Latin America, Africa, Asia or 
any other continent whose neigh-
bors, upon some pretext or an-
other, huving assemhled at a re-
gional meeting, arbitrarily decide 
to apply it to the machinery of 
coercion in the form of enforce-
ment action, thus usurping the 
prerogatives of the Security Coun-
cil.13'4 
With this background, it must be said 
that the United S'tates, for essentially its 
own political purposes, has been prin-
cipally responsible for creating a series 
of precedents which lend some color of 
reason to the Soviet efforts to legiti-
matize its Czechoslovakia intervention. 
At the very least, it must be said that 
the precedents set by prior OAS actions 
make it difficult to deny the efficacy of 
admonitions such as that of Harlan 
Cleveland, when he said in 1963: 
"Watch carefully the precedents you 
set. You will have to live with the 
institutions you create. The law you 
make may be your own.,,1 3 5 
IV -CONCLUSIONS 
At the out!'ct of this paper, lilt! lhcsiH 
was proposed that intervention as a 
sanction for an international delict was 
legitimatized hy contemporary inlcrnn-
tional law, provided such intervention 
was taken by a collectivity of states 
acting either through or under the 
auspices of the United Nations. It has 
also been noted throughout this paper 
that if the "effective collective" pro-
cedures promised by the charter do not' 
materialize, that states must be ex-
pected to look elsewhere for the previ-
ously h~ld right of unilat('ral s('lf-help 
whi('h has he(,ll d('nil,d to thl'm. That 
Ihi!' lalll'r l'Our~t' of Ilt'tioll hllB htWII 
fully suhsl'rillt'd to by the world's major 
powers should be obvious from the case 
histories digested above, as should IH~, 
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also, the basic thesis that collective 
intervention hy regional groupings, at 
least where a major power is a partner in 
the intervening collectivity, has heen 
sanctioned consistently by the inaction 
of the Security Council. Thus, where 
the direct interests of the major powers 
are involved, the regional collectivity 
has become the principal and preferred 
instrument for the settlement of dis-
putes within those areas of Great Power 
political dominance. The long and tortu-
ous path which has led to this triumph 
of regionalism over the universalism of 
the charter is cluttered with the debris 
of article ~(4) and article 5:3( I), hoth of 
which have been emasculated by politi-
cally motivated reinterpretations of the 
charter, reinterpretations which have 
been necessary so that regional group-
ings could take action, with some sem-
blance of legitimacy, which was con-
sidered politically essential. Although 
the arguments accompanying each of 
the incidents involved were cast fre-
quently in legal terms, their real import 
was not legal, but political, in nature. 
This has brought about a situation 
where, not without difficulty, but with 
precedent, one can interpret the charter 
so as to give some color of legitimacy to 
the flagrant violation of Czechoslo-
vakian sovereignty by the Soviet lInion, 
a situation which it can be said with 
complete fairness was never intended by 
the writers of the charter. 
Regional organizations, it is true, 
offer a practical and useful mechanism 
for the resolution of intraregional dis-
putes and for the imposition of sanc-
tions for a verified international delict. 
And it is true, also, that this sort of 
collective sanction is far preferable to 
the unilateral sanctions which charac-
terized the traditional law. But it be-
comes less true, indeed not true, when 
these organizations arc converted into 
"~roups of states called to ratify tl1l' 
decisions of a Great Power, "lor where 
they become merely the " ... chosen 
instruments of the great antagonists 
locked in political (·onnict. ,,2 It is this 
taLLer point which has b('en the ~('at 
source of difficulty. The Brezhnev Doc-
trine, the Caracas Resolution, and the 
statement by President Johnson during 
the 1965 Dominican Republic crisis 
have operated to transmute what were 
essentially political matters-i.e., the 
operation of an antagonistic political 
doctrine-into an international legal 
wrong. With this transmutation, and 
with the claim that such a delict has 
been committed, the regional grouping 
is provided with the legal basis for 
regional preventive or cnforcement 
m{'asures or for regional preventive 
action. Thus sanctions are imposed with 
some color of legality, and the interna-
tional community is powerless to ob-
ject. Regional groupings, therefore, have 
become instruments of a universal order 
in which law is subordinated to politics 
and instruments of power politics3 
through which the United States and 
the Soviet Union justify their actions as 
consistent with the charter. 
This resurgent emphasis on politics 
rather than law-albeit clothed at times 
in legal terminology-is not condemned. 
It is simply noted as a fact of interna-
tional life. The legitimacy of collective 
intervention as a sanction for an interna-
tional delict has been confirmed, as has 
been its perversion into "an instrument 
for political action. This demands the 
observation that the effectiveness of a 
system of international law does not 
depend upon the design or clarity of its 
charter, which clever minds can always 
interpret to their favor, but rather on 
the willingness of its subjects, particu-
larly its powerful ones, to be judged by 
it. There can be no effective international 
system for the resolution of conflict, for 
the identification and sanctioning of 
wrongs, until the parties to that system 
are prepared to have it operate sometimes 
against what they consider to be their 
national advantage.4 
It has been rightly observed that 
" ... what counts most in resolving dis-
putes is not so much the choice of a 
forum as a genuine desire to settle, 
which always carries with it a willing-
ness to lose.,,5 There is no evidence, as 
yet, that the Great Powers are in any 
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sense developing this "willingness to 
lose." Politics, not law, will determine 
the legitimacy .of collective interven-
tions in the future as it undoubtedly has 
in the past. 
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